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Abstract
In light of the recent mortgage crisis, identifying the origins is crucial
to prevent such a crisis from reoccurring in the future. This paper pri-
marily links foreclosure to subprime loan expansion. To that end, more
than one and half million subprime loans originated between 2006 and
2007 across top metropolitan statistical area in the United States are an-
alyzed. First, this research shows evidence that subprime loans played
a signicant role in the deterioration of the real-estate market. Second,
it demonstrates that other variables such as income and lending stan-
dards have contributed to the high default rate. Third, it conrms the
fact that subprime loans originated for the purpose of renancing have
more impacts on foreclosure. The results obtained are all signicant and
consistent.
Keywords: foreclosure, subprime, renancing
Résumé
Ce rapport traite de la crise immobilière et essaie d'identier ses causes
et origines an de pouvoir éviter des crises similaires dans le futur. En
eet, cette étude s'intéresse principalement aux hypothèques à risque
ainsi qu'au lien entre l'expansion du marché du crédit et la déteriora-
tion du marché immobilier. À cette n, plus d'un million et demi de prêt
émis entre 2006 et 2007 dans les grandes métropoles américaines ont été
analysés. Les objectifs de cette étude sont de trois ordres. Premièrement,
des preuves sont présentées an de démontrer le lien existant entre les
hypothèques à risque et le grand nombre de maisons saisies. Deuxième-
ment, cette étude cherche à quantier l'impact des variables revenu et
conditions de prêt sur la crise immobilière. Troisièmement, ce rapport
démontre empiriquement le rôle prépondérant des hypothèques de re-
nancement quant au nombre de saisies. Enn, les résultats obtenus sont
signicatifs et consistants avec la littérature antérieure sur le sujet.
Mots clés: maisons saisies, hypothèques à risque, renancement
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1 Introduction
The sharp rise in U.S. mortgage default rates has led to the most severe nancial
crisis since the Great Depression. It has had impacts not only on the housing
market, but also on the nancial market, the goods and services market, the
labour market and many others. Losses have reached extraordinary levels and
are still rising. The recent global nancial turmoil has been linked to many
catalysts, such as the housing bubble, the increased level of risk, asymmetric
information, and a change in monetary policy. In addition, preliminary evidence
in the aftermath of the crisis indicates that the probability of default is higher
for subprime loans. Subprime lending targets borrowers who lack or suer from
insucient credit history, and who would otherwise be denied credit. It has
increased remarkably over the last decade, evolving into a major segment of the
mortgage market.
This paper provides information about subprime lending and the subsequent
increase in default rate in an attempt to shed light on the causes of the crisis.
More particularly, this analysis aims at empirically examining the impact of sub-
prime origination on foreclosures. Data about foreclosures, subprime, income,
loan amount, and others, are taken from several sources; in addition, micro-
level data are analyzed to capture within-state variability, since the impact of
the nancial crisis diers from one region to another.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the context of the cri-
sis, denes key words and exposes the timeline of events; Section3 identies the
major impacts on the real-estate market and on the nancial institutions; Sec-
tion 4 reviews the related literature; Section 5 describes the empirical method-
ology as well as the data used for the analysis and presents the results obtained;
and nally, section 6 concludes.
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2 Background and timeline of events
2.1 Overview
The term subprime is not consistently dened in the literature so there is no
unique denition of a subprime mortgage.
From the lender's perspective, a subprime mortgage loan is a residential
loan directed to borrowers who are less likely to repay a loan because of lack
or insucient credit history. Thus, the lenders can charge higher upfront1 and
continuing costs2 than conventional3 or prime mortgage; they can ask for an
interest rate premium based on the expected risks of default which, according to
Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006), is typically around 2 percentage
points. Finally, such institutions are likely to practice predatory lending4 and
as a result can charge even higher interest rates on their loans.
Subprime loans have very loose underwriting standards. In fact, Ki and
Mills (2007), nd that the loan-to-value ratios5 are usually high: over 85 percent,
the debt-to income requirements are not very stringent: above 55 percent, and
subprime borrowers have a FICO6 below 620. Moreover, subprime lenders are
willing to accept limited or no documentation of borrowers' income and assets.
Subprime mortgages can vary a lot between one type and another. Interest-
only payments allow borrowers to pay solely the interest for a period of time
between 5 to 10 years, while pay option loans usually have adjustable interest
rates and allow borrowers to choose their monthly payment. The latter can
either pay the full amount, or pay only interest or a minimum payment lower
than the payment required reducing the balance of the loan. Finally, there are
hybrid mortgages that may start with xed rates that are often below-market
(i.e.teaser) rates and eventually convert to adjustable rates.
Interest rates on adjustable rates mortgages (ARMs) are pegged to a bench-
mark rate, such as the six month Libor rate or the one-year Treasury bill rate.
Over time, ARMs have experienced a sharp increase whereas FRMs experienced
a slowdown (Figure 1). Moreover, based on Chomsisengphet and Pennington-
Cross (2006), ARM borrowers have on average, lower credit scores than xed
rate mortgage (FRMs) borrowers. For example, in 2003, FRMs were almost 50
points lower than ARMs (623 versus 675).
1Upfront costs include application fees, appraisal fees, and other fees associated with orig-
inating a mortgage
2Continuing costs include mortgage insurance payments, principle and interest payments,
late fees and nes for delinquent payments, and fees levied by a locality (such as property
taxes and special assessments)
3Conventional loans are loans that are eligible for purchase by government sponsored en-
tities: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
4Predatory lending is an abusive practice where lenders charge excessive, often hidden fees;
successively renance loans; make loans without regard to a borrower's ability to repay; and
engage in high-pressure sales tactics or outright fraud and deception
5Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio measures the amount of the loan expressed as a percentage of
the value of the home
6FICO, developed by Fair Isaac Corporation, is a summary measure that captures the
borrower's credit quality
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Figure 1: Changes in type of loans over time
All gures are in percentage
Source: Demyanyk, Van Hemmert, (2008)
2.2 The rise of subprime lending
The subprime mortgage market gained national attention in the mid-1990s when
it started being considered as a major component of home nancing.
For some, the growth in subprime lending is viewed as an economic break-
through. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan generally referred
to subprime lending as the democratization of credit, that enables borrowers
with impaired or limited credit history to receive access to home loans that
would have been denied in the past. Subprime loans may give higher incentives
to become homeowners instead of staying renters. Also, it may allow some
homeowners, suering from liquidity constrained, to extract cash from their
properties.
Over the last decade, the share of subprime loans experienced a sharp in-
crease. Using data reported by the magazine Inside B&C Lending (2006), total
subprime loans grew from $65 billion in 1995 to $332 billion in 2003 (Table 1).
Moreover, according to Federal Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner (2006),
subprime loans were more prevailing, as newly originated mortgages conformed
less to strict prime standards and to government-sponsored housing enterprises
criteria. Nevertheless, it is the whole mortgage market that expanded, including
conventional, subprime and other types of loans. Indeed, mortgage lending has
more than quadrupled between 1995 and 2003.
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Table 1: Evolution of subprimes
Year Subprime
Origina-
tion
Yearly
Change
Total
Origination
Suprime /
Total
Origination
Subprime
/ GDP
1995 $65.0bn $639.4bn 10% 1%
1996 $96.8bn 49% $785.3bn 12% 1%
1997 $124.5bn 29% $859.1bn 14% 1%
1998 $150.0bn 20% $1,450.0bn 10% 2%
1999 $160.0bn 7% $1,310.0bn 12% 2%
2000 $138.0bn -14% $1,048.0bn 13% 1%
2001 $173.3bn 26% $2,058.0bn 8% 2%
2002 $213.0bn 23% $2,680.0bn 8% 2%
2003 $332.0bn 56% $3,760.0bn 9% 3%
Source : inside B&C Lending and World perspective
However, unlike the common notion that a mortgage loan is intended to
people wanting to become homeowners, most subprime loans did not follow
this same purpose. In fact based on Schloemer, Li, Ernst, and Keest (2006),
the majority of subprime loans originated in the last decade have been for the
purpose of renance7 rather than for home purchase. In 2004, 50.8% of total
mortgage originated were for renance whereas, only 39.5% were intended to
purchase a home (Table 2). Indeed, American households have used intensively
renancing to pull money out of their homes. Figures from Greenspan and
Kennedy (2004) indicate that over two trillion dollars were extracted in the
past ve years alone. In addition, according to Darlin (2006), even when interest
rates were rising in 2006, the renance pace did not slow down. Therefore, over
$500 billion were extracted in home equity, which represents more than the total
amount taken out in all of 2005.
Table 2: Distribution of subprime by purpose and year of origination
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Purchase 30.45% 31.55% 38.47% 35.21% 32.84% 32.09% 39.5%
Renance
(cash out)
47.03% 51.85% 49.65% 52.06% 52.55% 53.7% 50.8%
Renance
(no cash out)
20.12% 15.06% 11.75% 12.71% 14.61% 14.2% 9.68%
Other 2.39% 1.54% 0.12% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
Source: Schloemer, Li, Ernst, and Keest, (2006)
Furthermore, the nancial market experienced an unrecorded increase in
the rate of securitization8. In fact, according to Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig
(2008), the securitization rate has more than doubled going from 30 percent in
1995 to over 80 percent in 2006.
Securitization is a process where loans are purchased from originating rms
such as banks, mortgage companies, and others institutions, and then assembled
7Cash-out renancing indicates that the borrower receives the dierence in cash between
a new loan that is larger than the old loan
8Securitization rate is the number of securities issued divided by loan originations in dollars
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into pools and nally sold to third-party investors. These securitized credits
represent claims on the principal and interest payments made by borrowers
on the loans in a pool. Securitization helps converting illiquid assets into liquid
securities and oers innovative nancial benets such as a greater diversication
and spreading of risk, potentially broadening access to credit and lowering its
cost.
Figure 2: Securitization rates
Figures are in percentage
Source: Inside MBS & ABS
In the last decade, brokerage rms, banks, and other private institutions
took over residential mortgages securitization which used to be issued by gov-
ernmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
These shifts from public to private entities lead to the fast development of
private-label residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs). Based on Fur-
long, Takhtamanova, Laderman, and Krainer (2007), the share of total subprime
nancing through RMBSs grew from about 46 percent in 2001 to 75 percent in
2006.
Consequently, while the private and public sector might be working similarly,
the main dierence between them is that the latter is far more stringent on its
eligibility criteria and primarily securitizes loans to higher quality borrowers who
met legislative limits on loan size, credit score, and underwriting standards.
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Figure 3: Fraction of mortgages sold to private mortgage institutions
*Private mortgage institutions include all third parties except for Fannie Mae,
Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac
Sources: Mian and Su, (2008), and HMDA data
Moreover, investors were not only holding RMBS but also other types of
asset-backed securities (ABS). Therefore, they were not directly exposed to
subprime loans but rather through a combination of debt. Indeed, mortgage
institutions securitize several already securitized bundles of long-term debt in-
struments and then sell them to investors. For example, collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), are a package of multiple RMBSs and other types of debt.
As a result, these investors did not know the risk exposure of their investment
and thus had to rely on credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's and
Moody's. Unfortunately however, a very large share of investments was origi-
nally highly rated (AAA or AA) but eventually turned out to be implicated in
much higher risk.
On the other hand, the nancial innovations were not the only main changes
that occurred during the late 1990s. In fact, the real estate market and interest
rates also experienced some drastic alterations. Based on Furlong, Takhta-
manova, Laderman, and Krainer (2007), house prices increased tremendously,
reaching in 2004 and 2005 unbelievable gains while, interest rates dropped
sharply. Therefore, this period was characterized by low-cost access to the
equity in homes. Furthermore, speculative borrowers were drawn toward the
mortgage market because of the prevailing rise in housing prices and because
house values were expected to keep appreciating. They were thus after capital
gain opportunities.
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Figure 4: Monthly house price index, purchase only
Source: Federal housing nance agency, (2009)
These favourable conditions combined with the development in asset-backed
markets facilitated a substantial expansion of homeownership and thus encour-
aged people to take on more credits. Indeed, Figure 5 shows the sharp increase
in homeownership from 1995 to 2005.
Figure 5: Homeownership rate
Source: Census bureau (2009)
In addition to these changes in the market structure, some laws were imple-
mented and have contributed to the growth of subprime lending.
 In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act (DIDMCA) was adopted: it allowed charging high rates and fees to
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borrowers which was not possible until then. It pre-empted state interest
rate caps.
 In 1982, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA) al-
lowed the use of variable interest rates and balloon payments.
 In 1986, the Tax Reform Act prohibited the deduction of interest on con-
sumer loans, yet allowed interest deductions on mortgages for a primary
residence as well as one additional home. This made even high-cost mort-
gage debt cheaper than consumer debt for many homeowners.
2.3 Distribution of subprime lending
The subprime growth has transformed the mortgage nancial system throughout
the nation. However, the regional importance of subprime mortgages varies
considerably.
Figure 6: Geographic dispersion of subprime originations in 2006
Source: HMDA Data- Released by FFIEC
According to Mayer and Pence (2008), Subprime originations appear to
be heavily concentrated in fast-growing parts of the country with considerable
new construction, such as Florida, California, Texas, Washington DC, and the
Great lakes area. Concentrations are especially pronounced in Los Angeles,
Chicago, Phoenix, Atlanta, New York, Houston, San Francisco, Washington
D.C., Florida, and Dallas.
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Table 3: Distribution of subprime loans by major metropolitan area
MSA Subprime
Average
Subprime
2nd half
2006
Subprime
1st half
2006
Subprime
2nd half
2005
Los Angeles 14.32% 13.54% 15.36% 14.06%
New York 6.53% 7.25% 6.93% 5.40%
San Francisco 5.11% 3.96% 5.63% 5.76%
Washington D.C. 4.53% 4.60% 4.50% 4.50%
Chicago 3.64% 4.01% 3.37% 3.53%
Miami 3.45% 4.30% 3.45% 2.60%
Total 37.58% 37.65% 39.24% 35.84%
Source: Intex/DBRS
Moreover, geographical data shows that the locations where subprime rates
are high are the same that include faster than average increase in house prices.
Indeed, Mayer and Pence (2008), believe that mortgage activity is triggered by
a mix of increased construction activities and housing price appreciation. Ac-
cording to them, an area embodying this kind of dynamic must have greater
mortgage activities than areas with more depressed housing markets. There-
fore, it may be protable to move to rapidly growing areas: renters may have
better incentives to transition to homeownership; investors may nd real-estate
opportunities and nally, homeowners may pull out capital gains through cash-
out renancing. However, even though many papers argue that construction
and house prices are correlated with subprime lending, the link between these
variables is not universally dened yet.
Furthermore, according to Minczeski and Taylor 2007, the subprime loans
market has shifted from underserved areas to higher-income metropolitan ar-
eas. In fact, subprimes are initially designed to provide credit to lower-income
borrowers and to contribute to their development and growth. However, it may
be possible that moderate to high income borrowers have substituted conven-
tional loans with subprime loans. The main incentive behind it is speculative
behaviour and renancing.
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3 Impacts of subprime lending on the economy
3.1 Impact on foreclosures
The 2007 subprime mortgage crisis has lead to a large number of delinquencies9
and foreclosures10. More precisely, only months after subprime origination in
2006 and 2007, foreclosures increased drastically. Data compiled by First Ameri-
can LoanPerformance (FALP) 2007, show that delinquency rate is not consistent
across regions in United States and that the median subprime delinquency rate
is 17.4 percent, with a range from about 7 to over 30 percent. Some of the cities
that experienced the most severe delinquency rate are Stockton in California,
Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, Detroit, Indianapolis, Boston, New York
and Miami. For example, for the Stockton area in California jumped from about
3.5 percent at the end of 2005 to over 25 percent in 2007. Also, in the Las Vegas
and Phoenix areas, subprime delinquency rates reached 17.7 percent and 12.7
percent, respectively, in 2007, compared with 4 percent and 3.6 percent at the
end of 2005.
Figure 7: Mortgage foreclosure llings as a percent of households for MSAs,
2007
Source: RealtyTrac
Many factors are relevant in explaining the dierences in subprime delin-
quency rates among MSAs such as variation in economic conditions, dierences
in the riskiness of borrower, and changes in the house prices. However, the main
reason is the sudden and disparate decrease in housing prices across US regions.
Moreover, the slowdown of housing prices was accompanied by higher inter-
est rates leaving borrowers with no equity to sell their homes and prepay their
mortgages. Indeed, the Federal Reserve Board has increased interest rates from
9Denition of delinquency vary , but the one used here denes it as the cumulative fraction
of loans that were past due 60 or more days, in foreclosure, real-estate owned, or defaulted,
at or before a given age
10Foreclosure is a legal procedure in which a mortgaged property is sold in a legal process
to pay the outstanding debt
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1% in 2003 to 5.25% in 2006 which led to a faster deterioration of the mortgage
market.
Figure 8: House price appreciation and subprime delinquency rates among
MSAs
Sources: First American LoanPerformance and Oce of Federal Housing En-
terprise Oversight (OFHEO)
Finally, according to Demyanyk and Hemert (2008), loans originated in 2006
and 2007 have a much higher delinquency rate than loans originated in earlier
years at the same age even after adjusting for year-by-year dierences in loans
(Figure 9).
Figure 9: Actual and adjusted delinquency rate
Source: Demyanyk and Hemert, (2008)
3.2 Impact on nancial institutions
The subprime crisis has so far made losses on nancial institutions that surpass
750 billion dollars as of 2008 based on estimates from Lehman Brothers and
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Citigroup (2007). Also, more than 200 bank and mortgage institutions have
either closed down operations, or declared bankruptcy.
Losses are mostly prominent among investors holding unrated and lower-
rated MBS and CDO equity. These losses have occurred because mortgage
borrowers have massively defaulted on their payments. Moreover, the delay be-
tween the dierent reactions in the securitization chain has played an important
role. Indeed, the foreclosure process takes time to complete and thus principal
payments to third party investors' are not immediately aected.
The table 4 shows that the banking industry as a whole has seen a dramatic
slowdown in terms of protability and performance. Also, this table shows a
rise in non-current assets and other real estate owned (OREO).
Table 4: US banking industry
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Return on
assets
1.14% 1.3% 1.38% 1.28% 1.28% 1.28% 0.86%
Return on
equity
13.02% 14.08% 15.05% 13.2% 12.43% 12.3% 8.17%
Leverage 7.79% 7.86% 7.88% 8.11% 8.25% 8.22% 7.98%
Noncurrent
assets & OREO
0.87% 0.9% 0.75% 0.53% 0.5% 0.54% 0.94%
Net operating
income growth
-0.48% 17.58% 16.39% 4.02% 11.39% 8.5% -23.7%
Source: Federal deposit insurance corporation (FDIC)
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4 Related literature
The literature based on the subprime crisis is quite recent and reviews dierent
aspects of the problem. This report will limit itself to a few selected papers and
their contributions to the understanding of the crisis. In addition, this report
tries to nd a logical link between the selected papers.
Mian and Su (2008) conduct a micro-level analysis across the United States
in order to explain the mortgage credit expansion in subprime neighbourhoods.
They dene subprime zip codes as zip codes in the lowest quartile in which
borrowers have a credit score under 660 as of 1996. On the other hand, they
dene prime zip codes as the highest quartile of borrowers with a credit score
above 660. According to their hypotheses, the massive growth of mortgages in
subprime zip codes in 2002-2005 can be explained by one (or more) of these
hypotheses:
1. Improvement of credit worthiness of subprime borrowers
2. Expectation of future house price growth
3. Outward shift in mortgage supply increase.
The rst two hypotheses are not necessary for the purpose of this report, al-
though those two conditions are later rejected by the authors. Indeed, the facts
established that the income and the mortgage credit growth are negatively cor-
related for the years 2002-2005. Also, the growth in credit occurred in very
elastic housing supply that are highly unlikely to have large increases in house
price growth expectations due to the fact that the quantity of housing stock
adjusts quickly to any upward pressure on house prices.
As for the supply-based hypothesis, data from 2002-2005 show strong evi-
dence of reduction in denial rates and relaxation in credit rationing constraints
on mortgage applications in subprime zip codes. However, neither prime zip
codes nor subprime zip codes before 2002 have experienced similar characteris-
tics. As a result, the 2002-2005 expansion of mortgage credit mostly occurred
in subprime zip codes.
In addition, another important nding of this paper is the 2002 to 2005
increase in the fraction of originated mortgages sold to non-GSE investors. In
other words, 2002-2005 reected a massive wave of mortgage securitization that
mostly occurred in subprime zip codes. This central breakthrough lead to this
conclusion: lenders in subprime zip codes increased their supply of mortgage
credit in order to securitize or sell them to other private investors. As a result,
subprime zip codes have experienced an expansion in mortgage credit.
Furthermore, some economists believe that an expansion of credit will lead
to nancial instability. For instance, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) argue that the
nancial deterioration might occur through the release of credit constraints or
Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) argue it might occur through adverse selection.
Furthermore, Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2009) focuse their research on the
expansion in mortgage credit and nd that the rapid expansion in mortgage
credit and the changes in the market structure are associated with a decline in
lending standards and with excessive risk taking by lenders11 leading to credit
crisis.
11They take denial rates as a proxy for lending standards and loan-to-income ratios for the
risk taken
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First, they nd that in the subprime market, a strong negative relationship
existed between the lending boom and lending standards. Subprime lenders
appear to have denied fewer loan applications and to have approved larger loans
in areas where the number of loan applications rose faster. In addition, they nd
that subprime lenders appeared to have denied fewer loan in areas with a larger
number of competitors, and more specically, in areas with a larger number
of incumbent nancial institutions. These areas subsequently experienced a
sharper increase in delinquency rates.
A major dierence between the prime and subprime market is that in the
latter, information about the credit history of borrowers is not publicly avail-
able. Thus, under asymmetric information and speculative behaviour, subprime
lenders found it more protable to keep originating loans with no screening to
the applicants resulting in deterioration in the quality of the pool of applicants.
Indeed Fuller and Fuller (2009) believe that asymmetric information and moral
hazards were fuelled by mortgage securitization. With securitization, mort-
gage lenders have more incentives to increase the amount of credit without too
much worrying about the borrower and its risk of default. Thus, banks and
mortgage originators have less information about the borrower, about its credit
worthiness, the approximate value of the home and other macroeconomic mea-
surements since they won't be the ultimate holder of the mortgage. However,
third parties and investors have very little information about the underlying
individuals and homes in the portfolio of mortgages they have purchased via an
MBO.
This is consistent with theories of disintermediation where asymmetric infor-
mation among lenders plays an important role in altering the supply of credit,
and altering lending standards. Mian and Su (2008) come across similar results
suggesting the possibility of moral hazard on behalf of originators selling bad
loans to third-party lenders for the purpose of securitization. They nd that
the number of mortgages sold for securitization is positively correlated with
subsequent increase in default rates.
Likewise, Schloemer, Li, Ernst, and Keest (2006) highlight the eects of
subprime mortgages origination on the number of foreclosure lling. The results
of this article are signicant due to the large number of observations in the
sample that included more than six millions securitized subprime loans from
1998 to 2004.
First, this study reveals that the subprime market inevitably leads to foreclo-
sure. Indeed, it stipulates that even under recent favourable economic conditions
such as house price appreciation, and good monetary policy, as many as one in
eight subprime loans originated between 1998 and 2004 ended in foreclosure
within ve years. Also, half of all subprime loans will be delinquent at least
once within ve years.
Moreover, one of the most important contribution of this article is that
not only does it prove that subprime leads to foreclosure but also asserts that
subprime loans are riskier in themselves, regardless of the borrower's credit.
Borrowers who are already nancially stressed are receiving loans associated
with a higher risk of default. Therefore, even after controlling for dierences in
credit scores, subprime mortgages are found to increase the likelihood of default.
Some of the subprime characteristics that are adding risk include re-adjustable
interest rates, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, low-doc and no-doc
loans or the ability to renance out of an unaordable loan.
14
Furthermore, loose underwriting standards magnied the risk of loans that
are already hazardous, and so does predatory lending. In addition, third-party
originators such as mortgage brokers, who originated the majority of subprime
mortgages, have a strong incentive to close as many loans as possible, but very
little reason to consider the loans' future performance. Lenders shielded them-
selves from the full potential cost of foreclosures by selling their loans to investors
through the secondary mortgage market. And nally, insucient legal and reg-
ulatory consequences to lenders emitting home loans that are not appropriate
or aordable for the borrowers' situation exacerbated this credit crisis.
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5 The empirical analysis
This section is divided into three subsections. First, it explains the purpose and
methodology of the analysis as well as denes the empirical model; second, it
species the data sources; and nally, it presents results of the regression using
feasible generalized least squares.
5.1 Methodology
The purpose of this report is to empirically determine whether the subprime
loans played an important role causing the high number of foreclosures that
occurred in the United States in 2006 and 2007. More specically, the goal of
this report is to test the hypothesis that subprime mortgage expansion is behind
the subsequent high default rate and thus is responsible for the crisis. To that
extend, related literature have revealed that only a few variables are signicant
and, consequently will be tested to see their impact on foreclosures. Also, as
explained in Section 2, the eects of mortgage expansion has been very dierent
from one region to another. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on micro-level
data instead of national data. Indeed, Mian and Su (2008) assert that any
such analysis requires micro-level data, (...), the use of more aggregated data
can lead to erroneous conclusions. In this report, the variables that are selected
are listed at MSA12 level (Metropolitan Statistical Area)  a core urbanized area
with population density of at least 50,000.
Unfortunately, data on foreclosure are only available for the top 100 MSA,
corresponding to the largest urbanised agglomeration among the 363 MSA.
Therefore, this paper will have to limit itself to these observations even though
more observations or smaller denomination would have been better. Also, due
to a lack of publicly available data, the timeframe that is chosen corresponds to
the years 2006-2007.
The analysis that is conducted tries to test whether there is a relation be-
tween foreclosures and the number of approved subprime. Additionally, other
related variables are included to the analysis to verify their relationship with
foreclosures. Therefore, the focus will be put upon the coecients' sign rather
than their face value to establish the impact on the dependent variable. This
paper will test the validity of two primary hypotheses, (1) the subprime param-
eter is very signicant and positively related to foreclosures, (2) loan amounts,
income measure, and homeownership rates are key factors of the high default
rate.
The subprime variable is obtained following a series of meticulous manipula-
tion on a huge dataset. The rst step was to gather the complete list of subprime
lenders of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)13. Then,
adding all loans originated by these lenders gives the total subprime loans. In
fact, the HUD identies subprime lenders according to the reported spread be-
tween mortgage loans and comparable-maturity Treasury for rst-lien and junior
liens with a three and ve percentage points over the benchmark respectively.
These loans are referred to as higher-priced loans while all other loans are
treated as non-subprime.
12Refer to The U.S. Census Bureau
13See appendix 1
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Furthermore, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) requires from all lending in-
stitutions located within a MSA and with assets in excess of 30 million dollars
to le loan registers providing information on each mortgage loan application.
Therefore, by identifying subprime companies and adding all the loans orig-
inated by these companies, we can have the closest value to the number of
subprime loans in each MSA. Nevertheless, there is potential measurement er-
ror due to the omission of smaller lenders that do not report under HMDA and
to inability to classify lenders who originate both prime and subprime loans.
The dataset obtained with this manipulation gives information about the
purpose of the subprime loan. Subsequently, the analysis will try to evaluate
the eect of renancing and home purchasing on foreclosures. However, based
on the literature, renancing is expected to cause more foreclosures.
The loan amount gives an estimate about the real estate market in the area
and thus indicates the house price change between 2006 and 2007. According
to the literature, house prices are an important factor in the subprime mort-
gage expansion. In addition, the loan amount is used as a proxy for lending
standards indicating that as granted amounts are increasing, the less stringent
are the lending standards. Taking all this together, one might expect that as
lending standards loosen, mortgages become riskier and thus may lead to more
foreclosures.
The income measure used represents the ratio of the median family income
in a particular census track compared to the median family income in the MSA
where the census track belongs. This variable is considered an indicator of
wealth in each census track area, assuming that inhabitant of this area have
similar earnings and thus, similar creditworthiness. In other words, this variable
tests the eect of income and creditworthiness on foreclosures.
The demographic variable added is the ratio of the average number of owners
over the average number of dwellings. This variable refers to the homeowner-
ship rate which, as explained in Section 2, experienced a sharp increase after
the subprime mortgage expansion. Also, this variable highlights the prevailing
economic condition and the inhabitants' preference between being owners versus
renters. Therefore, testing this variable allows evaluating the incentive induced
by subprime origination.
In order to conrm these assumptions, several regressions will be undertaken
and their respecting results will be analysed in the following section.
The regressions are conducted using feasible generalized least squares given
the panel-heteroskedastic assumption. Indeed, since the parameters used vary
in time and in space, the error term have a high probability to also vary with
each observation. Thus, the heteroskedastic assumption is a very realistic one.
Similarly, the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation is very likely to occur within
panels. Consequently, the estimation with feasible generalized least squares can
be more ecient and preferred across panels.
To summarize, this analysis uses a panel model across the 100th largest
agglomeration in the United-States for the year 2006 and 2007. The dierent
variables that may have an impact on foreclosure are put at test using feasible
generalized least squares to correct for the existence of heteroskedasticity. It is
expected that subprimes, loan amounts, and homeownership rates are positively
correlated with foreclosures. Moreover, income measurement is expected to be
negatively correlated. Finally, renancing would be more signicant that home
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purchasing.
Therefore, the regressions of interest are:
FORCL = 1 + 2SUB + 3AMT + 4INC (1)
FORCL = 1 + 2SUB + 3AMT + 4INC + 5ODW (2)
FORCL = 1 + 2REFIN + 3AMT + 4INC (3)
FORCL = 1 + 2HOMEP + 3AMT + 4INC (4)
where
FORCL Number of foreclosure
SUB Number of subprime loan originated
AMT Loan Amount
INC Income
ODW Homeownership rate
REFIN Renancing subprime
HOMEP Home purchasing subprime
5.2 Data and descriptive statistics
The variables that are used in the estimation of foreclosures are extracted from
a variety of sources.
First of all, there are only three available sources on subprime mortgages:
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), Mortgage
Bankers Association (MBA) and private sector data providers such as First
American LoanPerformance (LP) or McDash Analytics. The latter two are re-
porting subprime loans according to the lender's business if it is predominantly
in the subprime category. FFIEC compiles subprime loans in accordance with
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), based on a threshold interest rates
charged to the borrowers when the loan was emitted, i.e. higher-priced loans.
Unfortunately, MBA only gathers data on a state level basis and LP's data are
accessible only to subscribed users. Therefore, the data collected and used in
this report are from the FFIEC accessible through the Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act (HMDA) for the year of 2006 and 2007. The HMDA Disclosure Reports
summarize mortgage information from data that are prepared yearly by indi-
vidual institutions as well as provide information about individual loan such as
the amount borrowed, the number of denied applications, the institutions that
gave out the loan, etc...
On the other hand, the FFIEC publishes various nationwide census data
based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 2000 census data. Census information used
in this report are the number of Owner Occupied Units and the number of
1- to 4-Family units. Finally, FFIEC Census Reports include income estimates
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developed by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).
Foreclosure data comes from RealtyTrac and are compiled on a micro-level
basis for the largest 100 US MSA. RealtyTrac has been chosen because of its
large database covering more than 90 percent of U.S. households' data on foreclo-
sures. Also, RealtyTrac is the only online marketplace for foreclosure properties
that have its data publicly available. Unfortunately however, a limited number
of observations is accessible to the public (100 compared to the 363 existing
MSA).
RealtyTrac data comes from their yearly foreclosure reports where they pub-
lish the total number of foreclosure lings by metropolitan area. Foreclosure
lings include foreclosure-related documents in all three phases of foreclosure:
Default, Auction, and Real Estate Owned (REO) properties (that have been
foreclosed on and repurchased by a bank).
The household numbers are based on the U.S. Census Bureau's 2005 esti-
mates of total housing units.
5.3 Estimations
After reviewing the related literature and explaining the model that will be
used in this report, this section lays out the results obtained from the above
model, describing their signicance and attempting to explain them. In all the
following models, p-values are in parenthesis below the corresponding variable.
5.3.1 Regression 1
FORCL =  32971
(0:076)
+ 0:36SUB
(0:00)
+ 23:72AMT
(0:121)
+ 399:79INC
(0:025)
This is a very basic regression where only the subprime, the loan amount
and the income variables are included and tested to evaluate their eect on
foreclosure. In the following subsections, the regression will be revised, adding
new variables to observe their subsequent eect on foreclosures. The eect of
these new variables on the overall regression will also be studied, to hopefully
obtain more insightful deductions.
In this rst regression, the subprime coecient and the income coecients
obtained are signicant at 0 and 2.5%. Thus, the conduced regression is con-
sidered to be ecient. In addition, the coecient of the loan amount variable
is signicant at 12%.
Moreover, the variables' coecients are positive, which imply that all three
variables are correlated with foreclosure. These results are not surprising since
they conrm the review of literature. More particularly, they are in accordance
with those of Schloemer, Li, Ernst, and Keest (2006) who assert that subprime
loan origination inevitably leads to foreclosure.
Furthermore, with regard to the loan amount variable, the positive relation
between the latter and foreclosure indicates that for larger loan amounts the
risk of foreclosure is much higher. Thus, it may be that during the analysis'
timeframe, the high level of foreclosure llings can be explained by subprime
companies giving greater loan amounts to the public. In other words, this re-
sult conrms the link between subprime mortgage expansion, decline of lending
standards and excessive risk taken by lenders.
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Finally, the income measure is also positively correlated with foreclosures.
This coecient seems at rst unexpected and contrary to the common belief
that poor people are the main agents behind the crisis. However, as mentioned
in many papers, riskier strategies and speculative behaviour, and specically
renancing, were more prevalent in richer neighbourhoods. This could be a
valid explanation for the fact that the higher the income measure, the greater
the foreclosures.
5.3.2 Regression 2
FORCL =  42818
(0:037)
  0:089SUB
(0:831)
+ 23:54AMT
(0:123)
+ 493:68INC
(0:012)
+ 94:13ODW
(0:267)
In this regression, the variable owners over dwellings is added to the model.
This variable refers to the homeownership ratio. The main point is to test for
the eect of a demographic variable on foreclosure and on the overall model.
Also, this new regression aims at examining whether the previous results are
still maintained.
Unfortunately, this model is far less signicant than the rst one: the only
really signicant coecient is for the income variable and has a p-value of 1.2%.
Also, another striking dierence in this model is the sign of the subprime co-
ecient, but since the latter is not signicant at all (p-value of 83%) there is
no point in explaining the negative correlation with foreclosure. Moreover, the
loan amount and the income variables show similar correlation with foreclosure
and are more signicant; this observation could suggest that the conformity of
the results conrms their respective role in the subsequent crisis.
One nal result to interpret in this regression is the homeownership ratio,
which is the number of owners over the overall number of dwellings. The positive
sign may lead us to believe that the subprime market created an incentive to
people to choose being owners rather than renters.
However, due to the overall signicance of the regression, the results obtained
in this model will not be taken into consideration. In addition, in the following
regression, the variable owners over dwellings will not be used.
5.3.3 Regression 3
FORCL =  37180
(0:004)
+ 0:076REFIN
(0:00)
+ 22:49AMT
(0:14)
+ 440:08INC
(0:013)
In this regression, subprime loans are substituted with subprime renancing
loans. The basic idea is to examine subprime loans by their purpose instead of
looking at the total number originated. The rst purpose of loan origination
that will be examined is loan renancing; in the following model, the focus will
be on home purchasing. Also, as mentioned previously, the variable owners over
dwellings will not be included in order to preserve the overall signicance of the
model.
The results obtained are signicant and thus the model is considered reliable.
Indeed, most of the variables have a p-value below 1%, except the loan amount
variable which signicant at 14% (p-value of 14%).
As for the coecients' signs, the loan amount variable and the income vari-
able are positively correlated with foreclosure. These results are similar to those
of the rst regression and thus validate the analysis and the outcomes.
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Finally, the renance variable refers to the number of subprime loans orig-
inated for the purpose of cash out. Renancing is in itself a risky behaviour
that is associated with a great deal of speculation and thus is more sensitive to
minor economic changes. In fact, Schloemer, Li, Ernst, and Keest (2006) refer
to renancing as a major component in the subprime mortgage expansion and
believe that it exacerbated the credit crisis. Therefore, there is no surprise in
nding that renancing and foreclosures are positively correlated.
5.3.4 Regression 4
FORCL =  30042
(0:1)
+ 0:66HOMEP
(0:001)
+ 27:01AMT
(0:077)
+ 372:36INC
(0:039)
This last regression focuses on subprime loan originated for home purchasing
and tries to relate it to foreclosure. The coecients obtained are signicant at
5% and 8%, and are positively correlated with foreclosures. Therefore, the rela-
tion between the explained variable and the explanatory variables is consistent
with previous results.
Furthermore, comparing regressions 3 and 4 reveals the eect of dierent
loan purposes on the number of foreclosure llings. Indeed the home purchase
coecient is 0.66 compared to 0.76  for the renancing coecient. So, as
expected, renancing leads to a greater number of foreclosures; more specically,
renancing leads to 10% more foreclosures than home purchasing. Surprisingly
however, the dierence between the two coecients is not as large as expected.
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6 Conclusion
Recently, many studies have focused on the mortgage crisis and tried to com-
prehend its origins. Many papers have proposed some potential solutions to
prevent the occurrence of similar crisis in the future. This paper's main goal is
to link the subprime mortgage expansion to the high default rate observed in
the United States. In addition, it tries to nd the relation between foreclosure
and some key variables. The analysis covers more than one and a half million
subprime loans that have been originated in 2006 and 2007.
This paper provides evidence that the sharp increase in foreclosure llings
is associated with subprime loans, loan amounts and income. First, there is
evidence that subprime loans are riskier than conventional loans and thus were
considerably responsible for foreclosure. More particularly, this paper nds
that foreclosure is more sensitive to renancing subprime loans than to home
purchase subprime loans. Second, there is evidence consistent with existing work
that foreclosure is associated with easing credit standards. Indeed, for greater
loan amounts, there are higher levels of foreclosures where loan amounts are used
as a proxy for credit standards. Finally, there is evidence that income played
a role in worsening the real-estate crisis. It seems that richer neighbourhoods
were more involved in risky practices increasing the probability of foreclosure.
Moreover, the eect of homeownership on foreclosure is either weak or absent
because including this variable reduce the overall signicance of the model.
These results seem relevant because they are consistent with related literature.
One limitation of this project is that the analysis is limited to only 100 MSA.
Also, this study is focused around the years 2006 and 2007. Thus, the results
obtained do not cover the whole eect of the subprime mortgage crisis.
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Data Sources
 Census Bureau
 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
 RealtyTrac
 First American LoanPerformance (FALP)
Internet sources
 Dominion Bond Rating Service, (DBRS)
 Federal deposit insurance corporation (FDIC)
 Federal housing nance agency
 Federal Reserve Board
 First American LoanPerformance (FALP)
 Freddie Mac
 Lehman Brothers and Citigroup (2007)
 Oce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Distribution of the MSAs of interest
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Table A.1: List of subprime lenders
AAMES FUNDING CORPORATION HOMELAND MORTGAGE COMPANY
ACCREDITED HOME LENDERS, INC HOMEOWNERS LOAN CORPORATION
ACOUSTIC HOME LOANS, LLC HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.
ACT LENDING CORPORATION IMPAC FUNDING CORP
ADVANCED FINANCIAL SERVICES IN INVESTAID CORPORATION
ADVANTIX LENDING, INC. JLM DIRECT FUNDING LTD
ADVENT MORTGAGE, LLC KELLNER MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS
AEGIS LENDING CORPORATION LANCASTER MORTGAGE BANKERS
AIG FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK LENDERS DIRECT CAPITAL CORP
ALLIANCE MORTGAGE BANKING CORP LENDMARK FINANCIAL SERVICES
ALLIED MORTGAGE & FINANCIAL CO LENDSOURCE INC
ALTERNATIVE FINANCING COP LIBERTY AMERICAN MORTGAGE CORP
AMC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. LIME FINANCIAL SERVICES, LTD.
AMERICAN BENEFIT MORTGAGE, INC LOAN CENTER OF CALIFORNIA, INC
AMERICAN EQUITY MORTGAGE, INC. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE CO.
AMERICAN GENERAL HOME EQU.(DE) M&I BANK FSB
AMERICAN HOME EQUITY MARIBELLA MORTGAGE, LLC.
AMERICAN HOME LOANS MASTER FINANCIAL, INC.
AMERICAN PIONEER FINANCIAL SVC MBNA AMERICA (DELAWARE), N.A.
AMERICAP FINANCIAL INC MERITLENDING.COM
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE COMPANY MILA, INC.
AMERITRUST MORTGAGE COMPANY LLC MLSG, INC.
ARGENT MORTGAGE COMPANY LLC MONEY CORP (FN)
ASSOCIATES INT'L HOLDING CORP MONEYONE, INC
BERGIN FINANCIAL, INC. MOREQUITY, INC. (NV)
BRIDGE CAPITAL CORPORATION MORTGAGE LENDERS NETWORK USA
BUDGET FINANCE COMPANY NATION ONE MORTGAGE CO., INC.
BUDGET MORTGAGE BANKERS NATIONSFIRST LENDING, INC
CALUSA INVESTMENTS, L.L.C. NEW CENTURY MORTGAGE CORP
CASA BLANCA MORTGAGE, INC NEW DAY FINANCIAL, LLC
CENTEX HOME EQUITY COMPANY LLC NOVASTAR HOME MORTGAGE, INC.
CHAPEL MORTGAGE NOVASTAR MORTGAGE, INC.
CHOICE CAPITAL FUNDING NPB MORTGAGE, LLC
CITICORP TRUST BANK, FSB OAK STREET MORTGAGE
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CITIFINANCIAL COMPANY OAK STREET MORTGAGE/GW
CITIFINANCIAL EQUITY SERVICES OCEAN BANK FSB
CITIFINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORP
CITIFINANCIAL, INC. OPUS HOME EQUITY SERVICES, INC
COLUMBIA MORTGAGE & FUNDING CO OWNIT MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC
CONCORDE ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION PEMM.TEK MORTGAGE SERVICES
CORESTAR FINANCIAL GROUP PEOPLE'S CHOICE FINANCIAL CORP
CORINTHIAN MORTGAGE CORP PINNACLE DIRECT FUNDING CORP
COURTESY MORTGAGE COMPANY PLATINUM CAPITAL GROUP
DELTA FUNDING CORPORATION POPULAR FINANCE, INC.
DOLLAR MORTGAGE CORPORATION PREMIUM CAPITAL FUNDING
EASTERN SAVINGS BANK RESMAE MORTGAGE CORPORATION
EHOMECREDIT CORP RIGHT AWAY MORTGAGE, INC
EMPIRE MORTGAGE CORPORATION SAXON MORTGAGE
ENCORE CREDIT CORP SEBRING CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P.
EQUIFIRST CORPORATION SECURED FUNDING
EQUITY ONE, INC. SELECT MORTGAGE GROUP, LTD.
EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. SOUTHSTAR FUNDING
EVABANK SPECTRUM FUNDING CORPORATION
EVERGREEN LENDING, INC. SPRINT FUNDING CORPORATION
EXPRESS CAPITAL LENDING STERLING MORTGAGE & INVESTMENT
FICORE FUNDING, INC. STEWARD FINANCIAL, INC
FIELDSTONE MORTGAGE COMPANY SUMMIT MORTGAGE
FIRST CHOICE FUNDING SUNSET DIRECT LENDING
FIRST CONSOLIDATED MORTGAGE TALBOT STATE BANK
FIRST CONTINENTAL MORTGAGE THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER FINANCE
FIRST GREENSBORO HOME EQUITY THE LENDING CONNECTION, INC
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF AMERICA THE MORTGAGE OUTLET
FIRST NLC FINANCIAL SERVICES THE MORTGAGE OUTLET, INC.
FIRST STATE MORTGAGE CORPORATION TOWN & COUNTRY CREDIT CORP
FIRST STREET FINANCIAL, INC. UNIMORTGAGE LLC
FLEXPOINT FUNDING CORPORATION UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
FREMONT INVESTMENT & LOAN UNITED MIDWEST SAVINGS BANK
GMFS, LLC UNITED-BILT HOMES, INC.
HAMILTON MORTGAGE COMPANY WALTER MORTGAGE COMPANY
HARBORSIDE FINANCIAL NETWORK WELLS FARGO FIN'L, INC
HARBOURTON MORTGAGE INVESTMENT WILMINGTON FINANCE, INC.
HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION WMC MORTGAGE CORP.
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